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RECENT BOOKS
This department undertakes to note or review briefly current books on law and materials closely related thereto. Periodicals, court reports, and other publications that appear
at frequent intervals are not included. The information given in the notes is derived from
inspectio~ of the books, publishers' literature, and the ordinary library sources.

BRIEF REVIEWS
JumsPRUDENCB-hs AMEmcAN PROPHETS. A Survey of Taught Jurisprudence.
By Harold Gill Reuschlein. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1951. Pp. xvii,

527.
This is essentially a textbook about jurisprudence in America; it is a textbook in jurisprudence only incidentally as the reader discerns the author's
evaluation of the view being presented.
As has been frequently pointed out, there is a dearth of textbooks indigenous
to America dealing with approaches to jurisprudence other than the analytical.1
The present volume does not purport to fill this gap, but it is most useful in
helping to compensate for the deficiency. By reference to Professor Reuschlein's work the reader may obtain information about particular juristic views
which might otherwise require extensive bibliographical research followed by the
reading of a large number of relatively independent articles and monographs.
This is so since, despite the lack of treatises about a particular view of jurisprudence, there is a considerable body of literature having these problems for
subject matter. Appended to the volume is "A list-biographical and selectively
bibliographical-for purposes of identification and for the stimulation to further
reading,"2 which further aids the reader in finding his way into the maze of
available literature.
Reuschlein first sketches the influences which plied upon the earliest developments in American Law; then by examining the "taught law" of Wilson,
Kent, Story, and some later teachers, he seeks "to note how the fundamental
problems of Jurisprudence have been formulated in this country."3 The works
of Wilson, Kent, Cooley, and to a lesser extent, Story, reveal the influence of
the then still firmly entrenched concern with religion, as well as the influence
of the rising conviction as to the supremacy of reason. Natural law doctrines
were dominant despite the first stirrings of science with its consequent effect
upon legal thinking, as well as upon thinking in general.
In the subsequent taught law there appeared different theories of jurisprudence. Langdell's awareness of the achievements of science and his resulting efforts to apply a somewhat Baconian conception of science to the problems
of law are responsible for the American system of case study. Also to be taken
account of is the work of Ames, who supplied the still firm foundation for much
1 See e.g. STONE,

2p. 465.
ap. 29.
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historical jurisprudence, the work of Carter upon law as custom, and the championing of the economic interpretation of law by Brooks Adams. During this
time the trenchant influence of analytical jurisprudence did not wane for lack
of exponents, among whom may be mentioned Gray and Hohfeld.
It is interesting to note that these predecessors of contemporary jurisprudence, did, in a sense, formulate the fundamental legal problems in this country.
Nearly all who were to follow could claim an honorable ancestry; if a new
school could not trace a respectable lineage, at least it did not have to look far
to find something against which to react. Then, of course, there was always
Holmes, in whose shadows all sought to locate their legal mansions. Reuschlein
points out: "Much of the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes chronologically belongs to the period we have just considered but in point of content, it has close
connection - indeed it fathered- the thought of Pound, Frank, Llewellyn,
Rodell and scores of other socio-economic legal thinkers, realists and iconoclasts."4
It is with the survey of contemporary jurisprudence that the author commences his chief task, and in approximately three hundred and sixty pages the
work of some fifty individuals is discussed. Limitations of space hardly allow
for any detailed treatment here of the extensive information presented. Some
individuals are grouped into schools of thought and so treated when convenient,
some are discussed separately when their work does not seem to fall into one
of the proposed categories. Reuschlein uses categories of thought designated
by a one or two word name and, as is usual with such classifications, individuals are included in a particular category who lie far out in the periphery. For
example, considered under the heading "The Realists,'' one finds J. W. Bingham, T. Arnold, K. Llewellyn, L. Green, J. Frank, M. Radin, H. E. Yntema,
W. 0. Douglas, F. Cohen, M. Lerner, W. Nelles, T. R. Powell, F. Rodell, H.J.
Laski, and E. N. Carlin.
In one of the book's most valuable sections is found a discussion of the
sources and the nature of the views so well known to us as sociological jurisprudence. This summary of Dean Pound's work adds to the growing literature
serving as a substitute for the full analysis long promised by Pound which was
to appear in a volume to be entitled Sociological Jurisprudence. 5
Stone, Vanderbilt, Wigmore, Kocourek, and pragmatism in general are
discussed upon concluding the presentation of Dean Pound's position. Naturally enough, pragmatism leads to the realists, of whom Reuschlein says: "It may
be that the neo-realists suffer from a strange color blindness. When they look
at a rule or principle it appears to them as a red B.ag to incite them to rage. A
rule or principle is not necessarily a red thing, although at times it may be.
Usually it is many-colored. In other words, the neo-realist is quite as guilty as
the legal fundamentalist of looking at rules, principles and concepts as finalities,
4

P. 95.

5 Pound,

"The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,'' 24 HAnv. L. R:sv.
591, note (1911).
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albeit the non-realists look at them in contemp.t while the fundamentalist gazes
with an air of adulation."6
Reuschlein is surely successful in including in his survey of contemporary
American jurisprudence the most notorious aspect of legal realism. It may
well be that there has been a plethora of literature in the past fifteen years to
support the suggested evaluation, but one may wonder if there is not something more that should be said about realism in such a survey. Perhaps the empirical orientation of the so-called "realists," although less frequently the subject
of a book or article, is of equally great lasting significance. In general, the realism
exhibited by "the realist'' has been the result of an effort to treat the law as something other than the subject for ethereal speculation. The realists have not been
aestheticians demanding realism for its own sake; rather, the realism has been a
result of a method of analysis, a method whic~ found repugnant the fireside contemplation of the "great ideal" of law as the application of Aristotelian Logic to a
sanctified major premise. What is here urged is that a frequently underestimated
aspect of the significance of the "realist school" lies in their effort to apply the
empiricism of Hume, motivated by the pragmatism of Dewey and James, to the
problems of law.7
After considering the relation between law and scientific method, sociology,
psychology, and logic via Kelsen, 8 the doctrines of the neo-scholastics are examined. In this section is found a discussion of the works of the men largely
responsible for the current revival of interest in natural law. Although much
heated argument has been, and may be, expended in advocating the supremacy
of natural law doctrines, the author has not fallen victim to temptation, despite
his own conviction as to the desirability of this approach. As Dean Pound observes in the introduction, "the author is to be commended for consistent exhibition of what Mr. Dooley would have called juristic gentlemanly restraint." 9
The concluding section of the chapter deals with "integrative jurisprudence,"10 the salient feature of which is the emphasis upon what may be called
critical synthesis. It is an effort to avoid the pitfalls of the particularism of any
one juristic attitude, an effort to avoid the "separation of value, fact and idea
(form)."11 Among the initiates of this "school" are found Cardozo, Patterson,
Cairns, M. Cohen, Fuller, Hall, and Cahn. One may question whether the
distinguishing characteristic of each of these men is the avoidance of the particularistic fallacy. Nevertheless, it is true, that to a greater or lesser degree they do
sp. 192.
7 Cf. as to role of pragmatism in American law, Cowan, "A Report on the Status of
Philosophy of Law in the United States," 50 CoL. L. REv. 1086, esp. pp. 1092 ff. (1950).
s Here, as throughout the volume, Reuschlein by recourse to individual exponents,
explicates the position under discussion.
9 P. xii.
10 Reuschlein indicates his debt to Professor Hall for the term (p. 404) and offers an
extended explanation of it in the subsequent presentation of Hall's views, pp. 445-458.
11 Quoted by Reuschlein, p. 404, from Jerome Hall, Integrative Jurisprudence in
INTERPRETATIONS OF MooERN LEGAL PmLOSOPHY 313 (Edited by Sayre, 1947).
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share a concern as to method. Cardozo's concern with the method for the
growth of the law, Patterson's investigation of the role of science and logic in
law, Cohen's polarity, all bespeak an interest in methodology. But, on the other
hand, each of these jurisprudents has also expressed convictions as to the end
toward which these views should lead. Are the convictions of Cardozo, Fuller,
and Hall any less vigorous that those of Pound, Frank, and Holmes?
Dean Pound points out in the introduction that the purpose of a survey is
not only to reveal what has happened, but also, "to show how far [juristic
thought] has moved or is moving toward what is taken to be the ideal form and
content."12 In regard to the latter objective Reuschlein concludes: "If a survey
... teaches us anything at all, it must teach us that there is not likely to be a
complete monopoly of truth in the legal philosophy of any particular school or
of any particular thinker. The thoughtful student of jurisprudence-no matter
what his age-still wants to make his own integration of the legal philosophies
he studies. . . . He will sincerely attempt to harmonize and reconcile various
judgments. That means he ought not to be afraid to identify law with morals."18
It need hardly be suggested that if one were to "attempt to harmonize and
reconcile various judgments," and if one were to understand all that Professor
Reuschlein has so well surveyed, it does not entail as a necessary implication
the identification of law and morals.
In conclusion, it may well be· suggested that Professor Reuschlein's generally
objective presentation of the "schools" warrants a reading of the volume by the
student and lawyer who would gain insight into the broader aspects of American
juristic thinking. Although perhaps pedagogically unsuited for a mature course
in jurisprudence, the book can be as useful to the student of jurisprudence as a
sound dictionary is to the student of writing.
S. I. Shuman*
12p. x.
1sp. 463.

* Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania 1951; former instructor in Philosophy, University
of Pennsylvania.-Ed.

